Introduction
The use of taxes to correct environmental externalities is a standard public finance proposition rooted in the seminal work of Pigou roughly one hundred years ago (Pigou 1920) . Apart from protecting the environment as a public good and making the polluters pay for damages, environmental taxes raise revenues that can be used to reduce existing tax distortions. Such green tax reforms may then provide an opportunity to earn a double (or even triple) dividend (Pearce 1991; Repetto 1992 ). They do not only improve the environment -the first dividend.
They may also contribute to a reduction of the overall excess burden of the tax system -the second dividend -and may help to alleviate involuntary unemployment -the third dividend.
1 Given increasing environmental pressures from local air pollution but also global externalities such as greenhouse gas emissions, international organisations -notably, the European Commission (EC 2011), the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2013) , and the OECD -have highlighted the importance of boosting environmental taxes in modern taxation systems.
While environmental taxes meanwhile play a more prominent role in the tax system of various OECD countries (OECD 2017) , policy makers in Spain so far have been rather reluctant to make more comprehensive use of environmental taxes . A few additional environmental taxes were introduced in 2012, but according to the Lagares Report (Informe Lagares, 2014) , these measures remained "fragmentary and limited". 2 In 2015, the percentage of tax revenue attributable to energy/environmental taxes 3 was 1.8% of GDP, compared to 2.4%
for the EU-28 average putting Spain to fourth-last in the EU-28 with a substantial leeway to topranked countries such as Denmark, whose environmental tax revenue is 4% of GDP (Eurostat 2017 ).
Gago and Labandeira (2014) discuss three major reasons for this lack of political support in Spain: 1) concerns on regressive impacts; 2) the threat of adverse competitiveness effects which 1 The potential effects of green tax reforms have been investigated in a large number of theoretical and applied papers; for early surveys see Goulder (1995) and Bovenberg (1999) -a more recent metaregression analysis of the double-dividend hypothesis is provided by Anger et al. (2010) . 2 The report by a committee of Experts for the Reform of the Spanish Tax System (known as the Lagares Report) was issued at the request of the Spanish government and submitted in August 2014. It proposed numerous measures for modernising the Spanish tax system including the more comprehensive use of environmental taxes. The report states that green tax reforms are "unfinished business" in Spain (see also González-Eguino (2011) or Labandeira and Linares (2013) ).
3 Tax revenues as recorded by Eurostat are divided into energy taxes (including taxes on CO2 and revenues from the sale/purchase of CO2 emission permits and taxes on all energy-related goods, including fuels), transport taxes (including those relating to the purchase and use of means of transport), pollution taxes (including those on emissions of pollutants such as NOx and SO2 into the air and water, pesticides, fertilisers and waste management) and taxes on resources (including mineral extraction, fishing and wood).
could lower the overall performance of the Spanish economy; and 3) the potential instability of environmental tax revenues as they are targeted to reduce their source.
Here we focus on regressivity concerns as an important policy caveat against environmental taxation. The rationale on the regressivity concerns of environmental taxation is straightforward. Taxes on energy or energy-related pollutants such as CO2, NOx or SO2 raise consumer prices for energy goods such as electricity, natural gas, heating oil, or gasoline. Since these goods constitute a larger share of the budget for poorer households than for richer households, environmental taxes tend to be regressive, in the sense that extra tax payments represent a higher percentage of income for poorer households than for the richer households.
The empirical literature on distributional impacts by and large confirms the regressive effects of environmental taxes (for meta-analyses see e.g. OECD 1995 , Speck 1999 , Speck et al. 2006 , Leipprand et al. 2007 , Peter et al. 2007 , Kosonen 2012 . The European Environmental Agency (EEA 2011) provides a comprehensive literature survey on the implications of environmental taxation for various European countries. Although most of the reviewed studies find regressivity, several factors could mitigate or even offset the regressivity, such as the specific design of fuel (energy) taxation, spillover effects to factor prices, or the use of additional tax revenues. Energy taxes on households' heating fuels are identifed as clearly regressive. But taxes on motor fuels (oil, diesel) tend to hit low income groups relatively less than high income groups for the case that high income groups tend to spend more on transportation fuels (as a share of their income) than low income groups.
4
Moreover, environmental taxes do not only affect the prices of consumer goods, but also can affect sources of income, such as wages and returns to capital. Many (partial equilibirum) studies on the incidence of taxation focus on the expenditure side and miss the (general equilibrium) feedback effects on factor incomes. Finally, the recycling of additional revenues can drastically affect the overall distributional consequences either enforcing or offsetting the direct incidence of environmental taxes. For example, one can enforce the regressive impacts of heating fuel taxation by combining it with a regressive use of revenues (such as a cut in taxes on capital); alternatively, one can opt for a progressive use of revenues (such as lump-sum transfers).
In this paper, we make the case for a green tax reform in Spain where revenues are redistributed lump-sum to Spanish households. Our tax reform reflects policy-relevant pressures towards new environmental taxes on fuels, local air pollutants, and CO2 emissions: 1) a tax on CO2 (€40/ton) in all sectors (except transport) which are not covered by the EU emissions trading system; 2) tax increases on fossil fuels to bring them up to the European average (1.5% of GDP); and 3) taxes on air pollutants (NOX as well as SO2 emissions at €1000/ton) throughout the economy.
On the revenue-recycling side, additional taxes are rebated lump-sum per capita to private households.
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For our quantitative impact assessment of the proposed tax reform, we combine a multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Spanish economy with a microsimulation (MS) analysis of Spanish households. We find that the tax reform will entail significant reductions in emissions of CO2 (10%), NOX (13%), and SO2 (20%). Additional environmental taxes will yield revenues -estimated at €7.3 billion per year -that accommodate an annual €400 lump-sum transfer to Spanish households. Lump-sum recycling renders the green tax reform clearly progressive, providing first-and second-income quintiles with increases in average spending power of €166 and €65 per year, respectively. Households below the poverty line would even see their average spending power increased by €174. If we cast fairness preferences into a social welfare function with an egalitarian perspective, the tax reform improves social welfarerendering the Spanish tax system greener and fairer.
Our contribution to the applied analysis of environmental taxation is twofold. First, our results can vitalize the policy debate on green tax reforms in Spain pointing to the crucial role of lumpsum revenue-recycling as a response to regressivity concerns. Second, we base our analysis on a powerful combination of computable general equilibrium and microsimulation models to capture key drivers of tax incidence in a consistent manner, thereby increasing the robustness of simulation results and policy conclusions.
The remainder of this the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 features a brief summary of our method of assessment and the underlying data. Section 3 provides a description of the environmental tax reform proposed. Section 4 presents our quantitative impact assessment.
Section 5 concludes.
Method and data of assessment
For our quantitative impact assessment, we combine of computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Spanish economy with a detailed microsimulation (MS) model of incomeexpenditure patterns across households. The advantage of the CGE-MS combination is that we 5 In the policy debate, lump-sum recycling of environmental tax revenues is sometimes referred to as the eco-bonus concept. In essence, this concept combines environmental taxes with per-capita refunds. The amount of the eco-bonus is thereby independent from the energy consumption of the individual recipients.
can analyse the economy-wide adjustment to policy reforms and are at the same time able to provide a very detailed perspective on the policy incidence across households. Our integrated modelling framework does not only feature a rich representation of household heterogeneity but accounts for important inter-sectoral linkages and price-dependent market feedbacks across the whole economy.
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) model
Our CGE model shares the core logic of canonical multi-sector computable general equilibrium models (for a detailed algebraic formulation of the core logic see e.g. Böhringer et al. 2015) .
Decisions about the allocation of resources are decentralized, and the representation of behaviour by consumers and firms in the model follows the standard microeconomic optimization framework. the possibilities of capital and labour substitution within the value-added composite, while different energy inputs (coal, gas, oil, and electricity) enter the energy composite subject to a CES. In the production of fossil fuels, all inputs except the sector-specific fossil fuel resource are aggregated in fixed proportions; this aggregate trades off with the sector-specific fossil fuel resource at a CES.
Final demand for consumption in the CGE model is determined by a representative household, which maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint with fixed investment (constant savings).
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The representative agent receives income from three primary factors: labour, capital, and fossil fuel resources (coal, gas and crude oil). Final demand for consumption is given as a CES aggregate of composite non-energy consumption and composite energy consumption. Both the nonenergy consumption composite and the energy consumption composite are in themselves CES functions of disaggregate non-energy and energy commodities.
To reflect involuntary unemployment, we adopt a standard wage curve formulation which reflects empirical evidence on the inverse relationship between the level of wages and the rate of unemployment (Blanchflower and Oswald 1995) .
Bilateral trade follows the Armington (1969) Finally, the CGE model incorporates emissions of CO2, NOX, and SO2 via coefficients associated with the use of fossil fuels. Emission abatement can take place by fuel switching (inter-fuel substitution) or fuel savings (either by fuel-non-fuel substitution or by a scale reduction of production and final demand activities).
Microsimulation (MS) model
The MS model captures the economic behaviour of consumers and provides a detailed picture of the substitution effects in consumption following price changes (driven by price elasticities and income elasticities). Consumer demand is estimated using the "Almost Ideal Demand
System" (AIDS) introduced by Deaton and Muelbauer (1980) , the main advantage of which is that it permits a linear approximation of a flexible demand system. The AIDS satisfies the axioms of the consumer theory and does not impose constraints on the utility function. The log-linear approximation (LAIDS) of demand functions is as follows:
where:
represents the budget share associated with good i for a particular household, , the region where the household is located in terms of the seven NUTS 1 regions in Spain, 10 whether the household is living a private home, the number of rooms in the household, the age of the breadwinner, whether the breadwinner is unemployed or retired, the number of active members in the household, whether the house is equipped with heating, and the type of house, 11 and -denotes the error term.
The adding-up and homogeneity restrictions of equation [1] are as follows:
and the symmetry condition is given by:
Finally, the sum of must satisfy:
[6]
8 The Stone price index is defined as follows: log � = ∑ =1 . 9 The household categories used in our estimation are the following: adults alone; couple without children; couple with children; single-parent households, and the composite of other households. 10 According to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics at the first level (NUTS 1) there are seven regions in Spain: North West (Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria), North East (Basque Community, Navarre, La Rioja, Aragon), Community of Madrid (Community of Madrid), Centre (Castile and León, Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura), East (Catalonia, Valencian Community, Balearic Islands), South (Andalusia, Region of Murcia, Ceuta, Melilla), and Canary Islands (Canary Islands). 11 The house categories used are the following: luxury, high class in urban area, middle class in urban area, low class in urban area, rural industrial, rural fishing and rural agriculture.
We estimate demands for nine consumption categories including food, housing, durables, heat, electricity, fuel, transport, leisure and education and a composite of other products. Since the AIDS model is made up of a system of dependent equations, the share equation regarding the composite of other products is dropped to overcome singularity problems. Annex A reports our regression results.
Coupling of CGE and MS models
The CGE and MS models are linked iteratively based on the decomposition method by Rutherford and Tarr (2008) . We first run the CGE model which represents households by one single representative household in order to evaluate policy impacts on prices for consumer goods and production factors. The MS model then takes these prices as inputs and calculates household income and household consumption at the given prices. Based on the MS numbers, the representative household in the CGE model is recalibrated to reproduce aggregate consumption at given prices. With the recalibrated expenditure function of the representative household, the CGE model is solved again and then hands over commodity and factor prices for the next iteration round to the MS model. By repeatedly resolving the CGE and MS models, the two models converge towards an overall consistent solution. Thus, the coupled models produce identical results, as would a stand-alone CGE model with all heterogeneous households. The combined CGE-MS approach has the advantage of numerical tractability and reduced CPU time with respect to large numbers of households in income-expenditure surveys.
Data
The CGE model is calibrated to Spanish input-output (IO) data for 2014 (INE 2018a) . Output per sector is linked to household consumption in terms of consumer spending categories using a conversion matrix. Cross-price substitution elasticities in production other than of fossil fuels are based on empirical estimates by Koesler and Schymura (2015) . The elasticities of substitution in fossil fuel production sectors are calibrated to match exogenous estimates of fossil fuel supply elasticities (Graham et al. 1999; Krichene 2002; Ringlund et al. 2008 ). The CO2, NOX and SO2
emissions from fossil fuels are calculated using physical energy data and air emissions accounts for Spain in 2014 compiled by Eurostat (Eurostat 2018 
Environmental taxation and revenue recycling options
In our quantitative impact assessment of green tax reforms, we address alternative policyrelevant proposals for implementing additional environmental taxes and recycling green tax revenues. On the taxation side, proposals involve new environmental taxes on fuels, local air pollutants, and CO2 emissions. On the recycling side, options include direct rebates to households and reductions in social security contributions beyond the default case of leaving additional income to the public budget.
Tax on vehicle fuels
Given the environmental pressure from traffic, the Lagares Report suggests to increase fuel taxes -especially for diesel fuel. Likewise, the International Energy Agency (IEA 2015) is supportive of higher fuel taxes in Spain -not at least because of tax harmonization as fuel taxes in Spain are below the level of the European average. Here we simulate a tax on vehicle fuels to achieve the average revenues share across EU Member States of the EU, i.e. 1.5% of GDP.
Tax on SO2 and NOX emissions
Sulphur dioxide (SO2) and oxides of nitrogen (NOX) are the main causes on harmful air pollution.
According to the World Health Organisation (WHO and OECD 2015) , air pollution caused 14,000 early deaths in Spain in 2010. The WHO further states that the impact of these deaths resulted in economic losses equivalent to 2.5% of GDP. The Lagares Report suggests a tax on non-CO2 emissions such as SO2 and NOX which is harmonised nationwide. Thus, we simulate a tax on NOX and SO2 applied to all sectors of the Spanish economy. Estimates for the external cost of SO2
and NOX for Spain range between €5,000 up to €15,000 per ton (Holland et al. 2005 , Markandya et al. 2010 . However, the taxes on these pollutants introduced to date in EU countries are well below those figures ranging around €1,000 per ton (Labandeira and Linares 2013), which we take as the reference value for our simulation analysis.
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12 Spain so far stands out for being a laggard rather than a forerunner in environmental taxation (Informe Lagares 2014 , Eurostat 2017 . To keep with policy realism, it makes thus sense to adopt the tax rates on local air pollutants of forerunner EU countries as a reference value rather than setting tax rates at (much higher) external cost estimates.
Tax on CO2 emissions in non-ETS sectors
CO2 emissions are a key driver of global warming. 
Rebates on revenues
The extensive literature on double dividends from green tax reforms has examined various ways of returning revenues from environmental taxes to the economic system, such as revenueneutral reductions in income taxes, social security contributions or VAT taxes (for Spain see previous revenue-recycling options suggested by Manresa 2005 , Labandeira et al. 2004 , or Markandya et al. 2013 . While all of these recycling options may stimulate positive economic effects, they are less visible to the individual households as compared to direct tax rebates by which all citizens regardless of their status receive an explicit monetary transfer. Such lump-sum refunding of green tax revenues, which is sometimes referred to as 'eco-bonus', has been discussed by the Green Party in Germany and was, for example, introduced in Switzerland in
2008. The political economy argument in favour of direct tax rebates is its higher visibility, perceived equity, and social acceptability (EEA 2011) . In this vein, we simulate a lump-sum rebate for each household. Alternatively, we investigate the effects of a proportional reduction in social security contributions as an indirect recycling option. Table 1 summarises the set of six tax policy scenarios covered by our simulation analysis. On the left-hand side, we consider the imposition of environmental taxes without revenue recyclingin this case, additional revenues remain in the public budget and lead to increased public spending. On the right-hand side, we consider revenue-neutral tax reforms where additional tax revenues are either rebated lump-sum or used for reductions in social security contributions. Combination of all above taxes on CO2, NOX, SO2 and vehicle fuels (Tax_All)
Simulation results
We discuss the simulation results for the six aforementioned scenarios in three sections: 1) environmental and macroeconomic impacts; 2) incidence on household groups; and 3) social welfare effects. If not stated differently, results are reported as percentage changes from the business-as-usual (BaU) situation absent any additional policy measures.
Emission reductions and GDP impacts
The main objective of environmental taxes is to reduce harmful emissions. Figure 1 indicates that the scenarios proposed succeed in this respect as the implementation of additional green taxes lead to substantial reductions in CO2, NOX, and SO2 emissions. Not surprisingly, policies to combat climate change and air pollution are closely linked, as in both cases the bulk of emissions originate from the same source, i.e., the combustion of fossil fuels. If all the taxes proposed are introduced jointly (Tax_All) CO2 emissions are cut by 10%, NOX emissions by 13%, and SO2
emissions by 20% respectively. Furthermore, we see that the environmental effectiveness of the tax reform is hardly affected by our revenue recycling options. Direct rebates via transfers to households and indirect refunds via reductions in social contributions lead to almost identical decreases in emissions. Figure 2 shows the change in GDP and the unemployment rate. 14 Additional environmental taxes adversely affect economic productivity by limiting the use of fuels in production and consumption. The joint application of all the taxes (Tax_All) has a maximum impact on GDP of less than 0.6% with CO2 applied to a relatively large base being the largest single contributor.
Revenue recycling (compared to the default of higher public spending) alleviate the adverse GDP impacts to different degrees. As expected the positive revenue recycling effect is less pronounced with lump-sum rebates to households (Reform_Households) compared to the 14 In the base-year 2014, the unemployment rate in Spain amounted to 24%. Clearly, the GDP accounting does not value the positive environmental effects from emission reductions, which are at the origin of green tax reforms. For example, the World Health
Organisation (WHO and OECD 2015) postulates that air pollution in Spain in the year 2010 caused 14,000 early deaths with resulting economic losses being equivalent to 2.5% of GDP.
Distributional effects on household groups
In the discussion of welfare impacts below it should be kept in mind that the four tax scenarios stand-alone (Tax_CO2, Tax_NOX,SO2 , Tax_Fuel and Tax_All) focus on the incidence of public revenue raising whereas the comprehensive tax reforms Reform_Households and Reform_LAB refer to revenue-neutral policy reforms. In the former case, the level of public good provision will increase with higher public revenues and we do not include potential benefits at the individual household level from this. 16 In the latter case, the provision of public goods remains at the BaU level and -with the usual assumption on separability of welfare from public goods and private goods consumption -we can perform coherent welfare analysis across these tax reform packages. The stand-alone taxes induce adjustment cost proportional to income so the tax incidence in relative terms is similar across income groups. When all the environmental taxes are levied without any rebate (Tax_All) the welfare cost amounts roughly to 1.5% across all income groups.
Thus, we do not see a regressive impact. The reasoning behind can be traced back to the expenditure patterns of Spanish households as shown in Figure 4 . 15 According to Goulder (1995) "a weak double dividend claim is that returning tax revenues through cuts in distortionary taxes leads to cost savings relative to the case where revenues are returned lump sum. The stronger versions contend that revenue-neutral swaps of environmental taxes for ordinary distortionary taxes involve zero or negative gross costs." 16 Otherwise, there would be the need to have exact information for individual households on their specific valuation of changes in aggregate public good provision.
The taxes introduced affect energy-related goods such as heating, electricity, fuel, and transport.
When all the taxes are applied together (Tax_All), the price of heating increases by 12%, that of fuel by 10%, that of electricity by 1%, and that of transport by 0.5%. Low-income households spend a larger proportion of their income on heating and electricity (around 4% of their total spending), but the regressive effect of these taxes is offset by the much higher proportion of spending on fuel and transport by higher-income households (around 9%). We furthermore see from Figure 3 that the green tax reform becomes progressive when additional revenues are rebated directly to households. Note that while the rebate (roughly 400€) is identical per household, its welfare impact across household types is quite different.
For the poorest households (1st decile), a pay-check of €400 constitutes a marked increase in disposable income, given that in the 1st decile average annual income is €16,000. For the wealthiest households (10th decile) the transfer is rather negligible, given that their average annual income is € 75,000. In the Reform_Households scenario, most low-income households are in fact better off as compared to the BaU. Reductions in social contributions -although preferable to direct rebates in terms of GDP performances -tend to be slightly regressive and thus might be discarded on equity grounds. The CGE-MS linkage permits to decompose welfare effects by household group into the expenditure and income channels. Expenditure effect Income effect income groups yielding a regressive effect. Table 2 provides further insights into the differential impacts on income sources. Tax_All involves negative income effects across all sources, especially on capital and transfers. The poorest households have net benefits from transfers whereas the middle and upper classes are net transfer donors. Thus, a decrease in transfers entails losses for the poorest households and welfare gains for the richest. Labour income is more important for low-and middle-income groups, whereas capital income is more important for high-income groups. Hence, the capital losses compensate the possible regressive effects when all the taxes are introduced (Tax_All). Under Reform_Households the tax rebates to households make the green tax reform progressive.
The progressiveness of direct rebates is also evident from Figure 6 , which shows the impact of the reform before (Tax_All -cost in blue bars) and after-tax revenues are rebated to households (Reform_Households -net incidence after transfers in orange bars). In the first five deciles the money transfers offset the cost of the environmental tax reform, with the benefits being largest for the poorest households that receive an average net benefit of €203 (note the richest ones face a net cost of €599). Figure 7 reports the cost of additional green taxes and the net benefit after rebating for households below the poverty line as compared to households that are not at risk of poverty.
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We see that environmental taxes cum direct rebates make vulnerable households better off and thereby can help to mitigate poverty in Spain. 17 The poverty line is defined as 60% of the median household income. Households below that line can be considered as being at risk of poverty. Here, we place the line at €16000 per annum per household. As can be seen from Figure 8 , the welfare cost of taxation is larger than 1% (Tax_All) for most households in the middle-and high-income groups. Direct tax rebates (Reform_Households)
considerably reduce the cost borne by households and increases the progressiveness of the environmental tax reform.
Figure 9 provides further information on the incidence of environmental tax reforms for seven household types: childless couples, couples with one child, couples with more than one child, single-parent households, childless single persons, retired couples and retirees living alone. The impacts of green tax reforms differ widely across these household types. Couples with and without children are most negatively affected, while those who benefit the most from the reform are households made up of retirees. There is a close correlation between the impacts per household type and household income. This explains why couples with and without children are least favoured by the tax reform package: they tend to belong to the higher income brackets.
Households made up of retirees tend to belong to lower income brackets, so the rebates increase their welfare. Single-parent and childless single-person households deserve a separate mention. The former tends to belong to relatively low-income brackets, but the impact of the rebate is not so positive for them due to their large expenditures for energy-/emission intensive goods whose prices go up most, i.e. heating, electricity, and transport. Single-person households tend to belong to medium-to-high income brackets, but their expenditures for energy/emissionintensive goods is relatively low -the cost of taxes for them are thus rather modest and in total they benefit when taxes get rebated lump-sum. Households that include retirees make up a substantial part of the population (28 % of the total household population) and have great preponderance in political decision-making. If they are better off under the tax reform proposed, this could significantly affect its acceptability and viability.
Social welfare analysis
In order to assess the aggregate incidence of policy reforms across households and obtain insights into potential equity-efficiency trade-offs, we adopt the metric of a social welfare function. We use the social welfare (SW) function established by Atkinson (1970) : where:
-ℎ represents the real income level of household h, -ε is the inequality-aversion coefficient, and -N denotes the population.
Following Böhringer et al. (2012) , in our analysis, we present welfare changes as changes in the equally distributed equivalent income (Y ) as defined by Atkinson (1970) :
Trade-offs between efficiency and equity across alternative financing scenario are summarized by alternative choices of the inequality-aversion parameter ε. A zero value of ε corresponds to social preferences where cost distribution across households does not matter, i.e. a utilitarian When inequality aversion is low, the social welfare effects align with the ranking by GDP (see Figure 2 ). As we abstain in our welfare analysis from quantifying the money-metric utility from a better environment, it is the scenario Tax_All with all the new environmental taxes being implemented that performs the worse in welfare terms from an efficiency perspective. Direct rebates to households (Reform_Households) reduce efficiency cost slightly, but not as much as if revenues were returned by reducing other distortionary taxes, as is the case for Reform_LAB.
In fact, the outcome of Reform_LAB provides a double dividend, given that the tax reform not only enhances the efficiency of the tax system but also brings about improvements in environmental quality. As inequality aversion becomes more important, Reform_Households performs much better than all the other scenarios and provides gross social welfare gains. The other scenarios are relatively insensitive to the choice of inequality aversion, indicating that, even if no refund mechanism applies, environmental taxes tend to be proportional.
Conclusions
As many other OECD countries, Spain faces the challenge of mitigating climate change and protecting the local environments in a sustainable manner. To meet such challenges through appropriate policy regulations, the economic discipline has pushed the concept of an environmental tax reform over the last decades. Such tax reforms have been shown to achieve at least a weak double dividend, i.e. effectively reduce environmental pressures while reducing the overall cost of economic adjustments to stricter environmental regulations via revenue recycling. Prominent among proposals for revenue recycling are revenue-neutral reductions in those pre-existing taxes which are most distortionary thereby enhancing the efficiency of the tax system. However, while these proposals are attractive from an economic efficiency perspective, they might neglect important distributional consequences across heterogeneous households. More specifically, there could be trade-offs between equity and efficiency as the most efficient revenue-recycling option lead to a regressive outcome. Concerns on regressive impacts explain in part the reluctance of Spanish policy makers to go ahead with more ambitious green tax reforms. The obvious policy dilemma for broader social acceptability is to find a tax policy design which on the one hand is environmentally effective and on the other hand appeals as fair without inflicting (too much on) overall economic performance.
In this paper, we show that concerns on the regressivity of additional environmental taxes in Spain can be muted through lump-sum transfers of green tax revenues. More specifically, we suggest a green tax reform where revenues from environmental taxes on vehicle fuels, air pollutants, and CO2 emissions in non-ETS sectors are rebated to households on an equal per capita basis. Such a tax reform would have a progressive impact while leading to substantial reductions in emissions of CO2, NOX and SO2. Moreover -provided that societal preferences in Spain are rather egalitarian -the reform would improve on gross social welfare without an equity-efficiency trade-off to the current situation. In terms of practical policy appeal, the reform stands out for a simple design with only few additional environmental taxes and a clearcut uniform rebate mechanism. The latter could be refined towards differentiated rebates for more specific protection of vulnerable socio-economic groups.
The quantitative impact assessment builds on an integrated framework combining a multisector computable general equilibrium model of the Spanish economy with a microsimulation model of Spanish households. Our approach stands out for its comprehensive and consistent coverage of important economic drivers for the incidence appraisal of policy interventions.
Nonetheless, there are various avenues for extensions to foster and deepen policy-relevant insights. A more detailed representation of the pre-existing Spanish tax and transfer system for various household groups can contribute to the robustness of the simulation results; likewise, the explicit representation of initial regulatory "green" measures such as energy efficiency standards or quotas for renewable energy would be desirable to the extent that they strongly overlap and interact with environmental taxes. Our current model system is static -to track economic adjustment along the transition path as well as long-run effects on savings and investment would call for an explicit dynamic (intertemporal) time treatment. Likewise, the incorporation of (endogenous) technological change induced by environmental taxation and alternative revenue recycling options can have non-negligible impacts on the incidence of green tax reforms. We plan to address such issues in future research.
Annex A: Almost Ideal Demand System, estimated as a seemingly unrelated regression 
